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**Yafeng Xia.** "The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10.1 (Winter 2008): 81-115. DOI: 10.1162/jcws.2008.10.1.81. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2008.10.1.81> .

Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux

Reviewers: Xiaobing Li, Xiaoyuan Liu, Lorenz Lüthi

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Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge

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If most specialists on U.S. diplomacy and international relations were asked to name the leading scholars of Chinese descent on Chinese foreign policy in the Cold War, they would probably answer: Chen Jian, Qiang Zhai, and Michael Sheng. If the follow-up question was who are the leading Chinese specialists in China on the Cold War, most of us would respond: “next question please”, although a few might answer Shen Zihua. However, if we had Yafeng Xia’s essay in hand, we would move to the front of the class with a long list of Chinese scholars, new sources opening up in China from central archives to provincial archives, as well as published document collections and memoirs from Chinese officials.

The reviewers emphasize that Xia has offered a most valuable contribution with his survey of the status of Cold War studies in China with emphasis on the new Chinese sources, the research focus of Chinese scholars, the impact of their studies in China and beyond, and some of the challenges and opportunities in the field.

Chinese Cold War historians are very interested in Xia’s survey article and the H-Diplo discussion of the article. *Lengzhan duojishi yanjiu* [Cold War International History Studies], the only regular scholarly publication in China specializing in Cold War studies, plans to have both the article and the H-Diplo roundtable translated into Chinese and published.

The reviewers expand on some of Xia’s observations about the political and ideological limitations on Chinese scholars and sources as well as the desirability for a broader focus in Chinese Cold War scholarship.

1.) Xiaobing Li, for example, suggests the need for “full coverage of the influence of the Western Cold War historiography on Chinese scholarship, including the Western theory, methodology, and technology.” (2)

2.) “The lack of self-critical introspection and methodological limitations” are two problems Lorenz M. Lüthi adds to Xia’s assessment, noting an excessively patriotic tone in works except those from leading Cold War scholars and a “positivist and selective use of primary sources and a lax attitude toward referencing.” (1-2)

3.) Along with Li and Lüthi, Xiaoyuan Liu endorses Xia’s conclusion that Chinese scholars should seek out more engagement with international scholars on the Cold War. Liu also advocates that a new generation of Chinese scholars move away from a focus on foreign governments’ policies toward China and re-examine the People’s Republic of China’s Cold War experience and pursue new issues beyond the Korean War, anti-American imperialism, anti-Soviet revisionism, and the Taiwan Straits. In comparing John Gaddis and Odd Arne Westad’s views on the Cold War, Liu recommends an exploration of China’s role not merely as an ally on one side but also as the “only major player of the Cold War that switched sides during the confrontation.” (4) Liu suggests that China should be viewed most appropriately as a “calculative third force that kept changing partners in pursuance of its own agenda” which Liu connects with China’s past “since restoration of ‘centrality’ and

achievement of ‘modernity’ have been top items in a ‘consensus agenda’ shared by China’s political elites from the late Qing to the post-Mao eras.”(5)

## Participants

**Yafeng Xia** is an associate professor of East Asian and Diplomatic history at Long Island University, Brooklyn. He is the author of *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-72* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). He has also published articles in such publications as *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, and *The Chinese Historical Review* among others. He is currently working on a monograph on the history of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tentatively entitled *Burying the “Diplomacy of Humiliation”: New China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1949-1956*.

**Xiaobing Li**, received his Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University (1991), and is currently professor of history and director of the Western Pacific Institute at the University of Central Oklahoma. His recent books include, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army* (Kentucky University Press, 2007), *Taiwan in the 21st Century* (Univiversity Press of America, 2005), *Voices from the Korean War* (Kentucky University Press, 2004), and *Mao’s Generals Remember Korea* (Kansas University Press, 2001). His current research projects are Chinese military operations in the Vietnam War, an oral history of the Vietnam War, and military conflicts between China and the Soviet Union.

**Xiaoyuan Liu** earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Iowa. He is currently a member of the Department of History at Iowa State University. He has authored and edited several books, and his most recent publication is *Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950* (Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2006). He is now working on a book project about the Tibet question in China’s Cold War experience.

**Lorenz M. Lüthi** completed a Ph.D. in history at Yale University (2003) as well as a M.A. at Yale in 1998 and a lic. phil. I in History, Political Science, and International Law at the University of Zurich, Switzerland (1995). He is currently an Assistant Professor of History at McGill University. He is the author of *The Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1966: The Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) and a number of articles including “The People’s Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955-1963,” Reprinted in *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intra-bloc Conflicts*. Kent: Kent State University Press, March 2008; “The Early 2nd Vietnam War and China’s 3rd-Line Defense Planning before the Cultural Revolution, 1964-1966,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* (forthcoming winter 2007/2008); “The People’s Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955-1963,” *Cold War History* 7.4 (November, 2007): 479-494; and “Les relations sino-soviétique et l’effondrement de l’unité socialiste: Du rapport secret à la conférence de Moscou, février 1956-novembre 1957” [“Sino-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of Socialist Unity: From Khrushchev’s Secret Speech to the Moscow Meeting, February 1956-November 1957”], *Communisme* 74/75 (2003), 101-129.

China's position in the Cold War was not peripheral, but in many key senses, central, even though the global Cold War was characterized by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the two contending camps headed by the two superpowers. While scholars in the West began to recognize the importance of China's role in the Cold War, they wonder how Chinese historians are doing in the field. Have they constructed the history of the Cold War in China? Do they have any access to the Communist documents? Have they explored the primary sources in order to conduct objective historical research in their country? Where are the archival sources, and who are the Cold War historians in China? We have been guessing and trying to answer these questions since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.

Finally, the long wait is over. This timely survey article fills in the gap and provides some details on Cold War study in China. The author offers a comprehensive overview of the field and demonstrates up-to-date scholarly accomplishments and problems. Yafeng Xia's article sheds new light on Chinese historiography and updates the current literature on Cold War history. Although there were some earlier assessments, Xia has made an extraordinary effort by interviewing the leading historians, visiting the newly available archives, and combing through the publication to summarize the academic progress.

The article begins by tracing the main institutes, groups, and scholars in the first part, "State of the Field." There are three interesting features in this survey. First of all, it seems obvious that China's opening and reform policy in the late 1970s and 1980s had a positive impact on the development of Cold War study. The new generations of the Chinese leadership in the 1990s and 2000s encouraged historical research on some of the topics of Cold War history, since the sudden end of the Cold War had left many unanswered questions. As the party historian Zhang Baijia notes, the People's Republic of China (PRC) in recent years made "efforts to reevaluate the Cold War from a post-Cold War perspective, with a focus on new angles and new research frameworks and methodologies." (p. 88) The second interesting feature is that higher education institutes have become the center of Cold War study. After the leading historians like Shen Zhihua, Yang Kuisong, and Niu Jun left the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and took teaching positions at the universities, the center has shifted to the key universities like Peking (Beijing) University and East China Normal University in Shanghai. The third feature of this historical field is that a continuing improvement of the Sino-American relationship has played an important role in promoting the Cold War study in China. The American connection is easily seen from the first major joint Sino-American conference in Beijing in 1986 (p. 82) to the appointment of a Chinese-American scholar to the prestigious position in Shanghai (p. 84).

Readers will find the second part of the article, "New Sources in Chinese," to be the most important, especially for those who do not read Chinese. It identifies major sources available in Chinese from the official documents, writings, and speeches of the leaders, and memoirs of the individuals. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declassified nearly 42,000 documents from its diplomatic records for the period from 1949 to 1960 (p.

91). The article also lists the important biographies, analytical studies, and recollections of those who have worked with the leaders in the Cold War. Their stories look into the relatively neglected inner life cycle of the Chinese Communist leaders, who shaped China's foreign policy and made unprecedented changes over the past fifty years. An insider's view offers a better understanding of Chinese strategic issues and identifies some changes between the two generations that faced varied international situations and made different choices according to their time.

The third part of the article looks into the "Research Interests of Chinese Scholars." The main interests focus on Sino-American relations, Sino-Soviet relations, Korean War (1950-53), and some other areas. Xia notices that the Chinese scholars give special attention to China's involvement in the Vietnam War (1963-73) with an emphasis on the conflicts among the Communist governments such the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam. They conclude that "China actually exerted pressure on both Hanoi and Washington to sign a peace treaty with terms that would facilitate an eventual North Vietnamese takeover of the South." (p. 109)

The fourth part, "Impact on Chinese Society," and the last part, "Prospects and Problems," point out why some Chinese scholars are still frustrated in their research and teaching of the Cold War history. For political reasons, they have to find a way to publish objective accounts of the history of Chinese Cold War policy. Paying more attention to the links between Beijing and Moscow, recent research focuses on the cooperation and conflicts within the Communist bloc to re-define China's place in the Cold War. Some of the topics are still sensitive or even forbidden for scholarly research. In his conclusion, Xia asserts that the study of Cold War history in China from 1986 to 2007 has grown quantitatively rather than qualitatively (p. 113).

Xia has made a unique contribution to our understanding of Cold War studies in China. His article, however, could have benefited more from a full coverage of the influence of the Western Cold War historiography on Chinese scholarship, including the Western theory, methodology, and technology. For example, Chinese historians today no longer have to read a hard copy of the diplomatic documents, since a large portion of the archives of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs have become digital and accessible on computers. And some historians have employed new methods of the Western history research such as social or oral history approaches. Oral history has become more readily used not just to fill in factual gaps but also to serve as the main source for discovering both the theme and framework of Cold War history.

Yafeng Xia's survey of the studies of Cold War international history in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has done a valuable service to the field. I applaud his painstaking effort in collecting, categorizing, and assessing representative works published by PRC scholars in the past two decades. Because of his familiarity with the scholarly circles of the PRC, Xia is even able to introduce a couple of important works yet to be published. So this is the most updated survey. Xia's coverage is nearly exhaustive, and his critique of the state of recent Chinese scholarship is judicious. For the sake of discussion, I do have two points to make. One is to supplement Xia's discussion of the newly declassified archives in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and another is to express my hope for further growth of Cold War studies in China, which differs slightly from Xia's.

Xia's introduction of the newly declassified archives at the Chinese Foreign Ministry points to an exciting prospect for Chinese and foreign researchers, especially for graduate students who are looking for new information and new topics for their doctoral dissertations. Comparatively, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA) is more accessible and researcher-friendly than many central and provincial archives that are theoretically open. Its declassification process in the past three years has taken big strides and actually made the conception of "archival research" in the PRC feasible for foreign policy studies. Scholars have however not yet taken full advantage of what the CFMA can offer so far. This is, I think, partially because of limited publicity and partially because of the Chinese characteristics of the archives' "opening." Hopefully, Xia's article and this round-table discussion can help spread the word and change the dated idea in the field that archival research in the PRC cannot be done.

I have visited the CFMA a couple of times. Last summer, during a period of three weeks I met at the CFMA two foreign students enrolled in Peking University and a few Chinese researchers. In the meantime, I saw more foreign delegations coming to take photos and learn about how the Chinese archives operated. I wondered why the place was not frequented by more academics. For Chinese researchers, the fees charged by the archives can constitute a hurdle. The CFMA charges a two-RMB reading fee for each document and five RMB for each photocopied page. These are actually reduced rates from those two years ago when five RMB was charged for each document requested and ten RMB per photocopy. In recent years a number of leading universities in China are known for their excellent financial resources, including research monies for their faculty members. But for some reason, archival research does not seem a widely established practice among history professors in China. In the meantime, I have not heard stories about how Chinese graduate students of the humanities have access to funding for their research. In the near future, I would not be surprised to see fresh archival information from China to appear first in Western-language publications. For this to happen, of course, dissertation committees in Western universities need to send their doctoral candidates to Chinese archives more often.

Aside from the price tag, the CFMA can be disappointing in a different respect. At the CFMA academic researchers do not really work with boxes and documents per se but with digitized images through terminals. For those scholars familiar with archival research in Western countries, they should not expect to find a “chain of documents” in order to assess at least an integral segment of Beijing’s policy making process. Like in other countries, declassification of government documents is a selective process. But unlike the practices in American or British archives, the Chinese way does not give the researcher any clue about what files have been withheld and remain classified. Code numbers are indeed assigned to the digitized files, but what these codes stand for remains mysterious. The researcher should also not assume that a document s/he sees in the computer screen is completely “opened” because its duplication is subject to another round of approval by the archivists. Generally speaking, state leaders’ speeches and conversations, and documents with their (mainly Zhou Enlai’s) hand-written remarks on the margins cannot be photocopied. In my own experience, “state leaders” were at first defined to mean Mao (Zedong), Liu (Shaoqi), Zhu (De), and Zhou (Enlai). Later Deng (Xiaoping) was also added to the forbidden list.

These are some of the realities that Western researchers may find inconvenient or even frustrating at the CFMA. Yet in China’s own terms the recent declassification of diplomatic papers by the CFMA constitutes a watershed between two eras. Even the controlled release of documents has already opened an extremely rich lode for scholars to mine. Now scholars of Chinese foreign relations within and without China, by bringing their trade to that place, can help accelerate the process for the CFMA to add a new function as a dispenser of public information to its old role as a vault of state secrets.

My second point is about a suggested research agenda for the future, inspired by the third point in Xia’s “prospects and problems” (p.114). I agree with Xia that Cold War scholars in the PRC should engage scholarships by their foreign colleagues more often and closely, and strive to contribute to every important aspect of Cold War international history. But, in my opinion, for now an effort to redress the problem of quantity over quality in current PRC scholarship, as identified in Xia’s discussion (p.113), should be directed first toward a careful re-examination of the PRC’s Cold War experience as a whole and hitherto overlooked aspects of that experience. With their language skill, familiarity with the political culture of the PRC, and logistical convenience, Chinese historians of the Cold War era can relatively easily take advantage of the newly available information in China. As part of the international scholarly community focusing on the Cold War, Chinese scholars have the responsibility for throwing new light on China’s Cold War experience more than on any other subject matters.

Those leading Chinese scholars named in Xia’s article, including Li Danhui, Niu Jun, Shen Zhihua, Yang Kuisong, Zhang Baijia, and others have admirably produced independent-minded works in this regard. But there remain reasons for concern that such a path has not been widely taken among Cold War scholars in the PRC, especially by the younger generation. Xia’s article carefully uses the term “China-related issues” in describing Chinese scholars’ research interests (p.114). More often than not, however, these are issues about foreign governments’ policies toward the PRC, not the other way around. If the 2006 “International Conference on the Cold War History and Doctoral Forum” in

Changchun was indicative of the research trend of the up-coming generation of Chinese scholars, more than half of the 41 conference papers were “China related.” Yet only six of the China-related papers considered the Chinese side to a certain extent, including two works by scholars based abroad.

There may be a variety of reasons for this seemingly lack of interest in analyzing Chinese foreign policies. In perseveringly coping with obstacles imposed by the political-academic environment of the PRC, the scholars named above have managed to invalidate a number of old party-line interpretations of past events. Yet, as Xia indicates, taboos still exist, and give people, especially younger scholars, pause for thought about what historical subjects they should choose for building up their careers (p.114).

In the meantime, I would like to caution against a collective fatigue in seeking new possibilities in the field. Xia’s summary of Chinese scholars’ research interests is comprehensive, showing however that the issues studied by Chinese scholars so far are hardly new. They continue to trace the trajectory of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) foreign policy orientations in the Cold War, the main concerns of which, with few exceptions, can be summed up as two antis (anti-American imperialism and anti-Soviet revisionism), two wars (in Korea and Vietnam), and a perilous strait (Taiwan). Surely these issues should continue to be reexamined, fuller pictures of the events involved be presented, and more details of CCP leaders’ policy making be uncovered. Yet these need not become standardized contents of the history of Cold War China. Almost two decades after the end of the Cold War and in the thick of China’s re-rise, scholars in today’s China are opportunely positioned to identify new issues, ask new questions, seek new paradigms, and, more importantly, venture into dimensions not measured by the “sextants of Beijing” in reassessing the PRC’s experiences in the Cold War era.<sup>1</sup> To my knowledge such efforts have already begun. I just want to use this opportunity to call for a joint effort by Chinese and international scholars to turn the trickle into a torrent. As far as the Cold War scholarship in the PRC is concerned, I tend to believe that the next threshold for it to reach lies in the field of China studies, not of foreign studies.

Two basic questions can be asked in classrooms and historical writings on Cold War China. The first question is the relationship between the PRC and the Cold War. Since the publication of John Lewis Gaddis’s acclaimed *New History of the Cold War* and Odd Arne Westad’s award-winning *The Global Cold War*, the stage has been set for a new round of debate about Cold War history. The debate is about the very meaning of the Cold War. One defines the Cold War mainly as a Euro-centric confrontation between two superpowers of opposite ideologies, which began along the banks of the Elbe and eventually spread to the rest of the world. Another views the Cold War as a “period” in which the rivalry between two global-missionary super-states for shaping the rest of the world according to their own images interacted with Third World countries’ resistance to or collaborations with

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<sup>1</sup>“Sextants of Beijing” is borrowed from the title of Joanna Waley-Cohen’s popular book, *Sextants of Beijing: Global Trends in Chinese History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

American or Soviet brand of interventionism.<sup>2</sup> These definitions nevertheless agree that the Cold War continued a long contention between two versions of modernity originated from European history.

In these historical narratives about a basically intra-West contest, China did not possess a separate, third stance. But was the PRC merely a devoted communist power second only to the Soviet Union? While Capitalism and Communism assumed such a definitive meaning respectively for the United States and the Soviet Union, neither seemed so fundamental to the PRC. The fact is that the PRC was the only major player of the Cold War that switched sides during the confrontation. If Mao Zedong's reconciliation with the United States can still be explained as a tactical decision in which geostrategy momentarily overrode ideology, Deng Xiaoping's accommodation to capitalism during the last decade of the Cold War decisively revealed the kind of ideological adaptability in Beijing that neither Washington nor Moscow could afford.

Then, should the PRC be viewed just as one of the Third World countries that reacted passively to superpower interventionism? Because of its sheer size and geostrategic location, the vitality of its revolution emitting influence among Third World countries, and the immense impact of its policy behavior on the two superpowers, a negative answer seems obvious. Thus, instead of viewing the PRC either as an ideological warrior on one side of the Cold War or as an innocent Third World recipient of superpower impact, it seems more fitting to consider the PRC during its first four decades as an aligned (in contrast to India), calculative third force that kept changing partners in pursuance of its own agenda. After all, a century earlier, long before the Western and Eastern blocs of the Cold War seemed to have polarized the world, China acted as the lone power on one side of an East-West confrontation configured rather differently from the Cold War bloc politics. During the Cold War period, far from running its course, this older confrontation was still simmering on the back burner. In a way the Cold War is comparable to the two world wars: All involved China but none was about China in its origin. From such a perspective, it should be easy to understand why the PRC could afford to switch sides between "enemies" and "friends" during the Cold War, and how the winner-loser dichotomy about the Cold War's conclusion cannot be readily used to determine the meaning of the event to the PRC.<sup>3</sup>

In different ways, two pioneer studies by two Chinese scholars based in the United States have taken important steps in investigating China's unique place in the Cold War. Chen Jian's *Mao's China and the Cold War* is the first general history of Cold War China, contending that in addition to Communist ideology, a "Central Kingdom mentality" was also driving PRC foreign policy. Simei Qing's *From Allies to Enemies* covers the first 15 years of the post-World War II era. The author bases her analyses on a sweeping argument about a

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<sup>2</sup>Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-7; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 1-18.

<sup>3</sup>In relevant historical literature China is portrayed as a bitter victor at the end of the two world wars. But was the PRC a "pleasant loser" or a "bitter victor" at the end of the Cold War?

unique Chinese version of modernity that, balancing and mixing capitalism and socialism, had advocates ranging from Sun Yat-sen to Deng Xiaoping.<sup>4</sup>

Since restoration of “centrality” and achievement of “modernity” have been top items in a “consensus agenda” shared by China’s political elites from the late Qing to the post-Mao eras, China’s Cold War experience did not fundamentally depart from a continuous pursuit of these goals, even though the Cold War international environment appeared overwhelming.<sup>5</sup> This leads us to the second basic question: What should be the content of China’s Cold War history? Necessarily, the content is much richer and more diverse than those familiar events in the PRC’s foreign relations that have received repeated scrutiny in previous Cold War literature.

“Centrality” and “modernity” have been inseparable in modern China’s external and internal affairs. In endeavoring to re-exert “centrality” in a geopolitical sense, the PRC had to target first and foremost East Asia where the old Sino-centric tributary system had existed until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. But, aside from Japan, Korea, and Vietnam in their familiar roles in Cold War international politics, little is known about how the PRC leadership tried to refashion their country’s relations with its Asian neighbors in a rather complex time when norms of inter-nation-state relations, Cold War ideological divides, and lingering memories of the old Sino-centric order all had a role to play in international politics. Meanwhile, in a frenzied search for a right formula of socialism, or a supposedly superior and speedy way to economically overtake its Western adversaries (even the Soviet Union), CCP leaders of the Mao era hardly differentiated between the domestic and international stages of its “class struggles.” The domestic drive of the CCP’s anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggles actually undermined the stability of the Chinese society more than any external threat of the Cold War era. Eventually, Mao’s “Cultural Revolution” made the PRC the sole cold-warring power that totally internalized the Cold War.

To sum up, the currently thriving Chinese scholarship of the Cold War can be strengthened by an extensive inquiry into the PRC’s Cold War experience as a segment of those longer threads of China’s historical development. As the “new history” of the Cold War is making strides, the growth of a newer history would be welcomed that examines Cold War China in a time span at least long enough to bridge China’s fall in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century and China’s re-rise in our own times.

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<sup>4</sup>Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 8; Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Ideology, and U.S.–China Diplomacy, 1945–1960* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 29-30.

<sup>5</sup>For “consensus agenda,” see Paul A. Cohen, *China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 132.

Reviewing the last two decades of Chinese historiography on the Cold War, Xia Yafeng has rendered an invaluable service to the field of Chinese Studies. In addition to assessing the literature published by Chinese historians working inside and outside of the People's Republic of China (PRC), he provides both a much needed overview of the institutions, major practitioners and their research interests in the field of Cold War Studies in China, as well as an excellent introduction to published and archival primary sources. Xia's article will become a key point of reference for both specialists of the PRC and the Cold War, and graduate students entering the field. Hopefully, Xia will keep updating the article periodically so that historians in the field can benefit from his contribution in the future.

Xia appropriately characterizes the study of Cold War International History in China as a developing field with weak foundations (82, 113). However, despite the authoritarian nature of the government of the PRC and the difficulties in accessing archival evidence, he argues, a small number of innovative historians have managed to unearth important evidence in secondary archives and include primary and secondary sources in other languages in their research (92-93). Xia's historiographical review implicitly conveys the hope that future generations of Chinese historians will build on these pioneers and develop the field further.

Unfortunately, the field of International Cold War Studies in China is still beset by problems ranging from governmental intrusion, language barriers, funding problems, access to sources, choice of topics, and methodological training. Xia correctly points to the narrow range of topics Chinese historians address in their work (Sino-American relations, Sino-Soviet relations, Korean War, and Vietnam War; 99-110) and the relative lack of interest among many Chinese historians in issues beyond the country itself (113). This situation is certainly related to the political limitations of research in the PRC, language barriers that hinder research of non-Chinese materials, and the scarcity of funding (although diminishing increasingly) that prevents Chinese historians from conducting systematic research outside of the country. This reviewer would add two other problems: the lack of self-critical introspection and methodological limitations.

As to the first, much of the Chinese historiography tends to be centered around Mao Zedong or China, although Xia shows there have been improvements within recent years in this regard (113). This certainly is due to the nature of the sources that are accessible and the dominance of Mao in the foreign policy making process before 1976. Also, with the exception of the works by the leading Chinese Cold War historians, much of the literature tends to lapse into patriotic and apologetic tones. Even though governmental intrusion and the resulting, pre-emptive self-censorship is a major obstacle to an open debate about the problems in China's foreign policy towards United States, the Soviet Union, or North Vietnam, the selection of research questions and the choice of words routinely reveal self-congratulatory and uncritical undercurrents.

Similarly, much, though not all, of the Chinese Cold War historiography displays a positivist and selective use of primary sources and a lax attitude toward referencing. Frequently, the validity of reliability of evidence eludes critical methodological analysis. Moreover, many secondary sources do not include footnotes or bibliographies. This practice is understandable where new research based on still inaccessible archival collections is published. However, the lack of citations of quotes from documents or the character-by-character duplication of pages from other publications without quotation marks or footnotes referencing the original source is highly problematic. These practices might be related to the customary lax attitudes of the past but they also point to the need for more rigorous methodological training at the university level. In fairness, however, many of the leading Chinese Cold War historians covered in Xia's review have adopted western methodological standards.

Finally, this reviewer wants to endorse Xia's call for greater interaction between Chinese and non-Chinese historians in the field of international Cold War Studies (113). Although some of China's, South Korea's, and North America's premier research institutions cooperate on a regular basis with exchanges or through the organization of conferences, the potential for collaboration is much greater. Many younger historians from China underwent graduate training abroad and many non-Chinese scholars conducted (dissertation) research in China; both usually established far-reaching professional and personal networks. The practice of co-publication across national boundaries, for example, has become customary in the field of pre-modern China; there is no reason why similar endeavors cannot occur in the field of Cold War International History and China.

I must express my warm appreciation to Xiaoyuan Liu, Xiaobing Li and Lorenz Luthi for taking the time from their own work to write this kind of review that motivates me to critically rethink my article. I agree with most of what they say. In particular, I share their fascination with Cold War studies in China. I welcome the opportunity to clarify, expand, and update several points referred to by the reviewers.

While I agree with Luthi that “with the exception of the works by the leading Chinese Cold War historians, much of the literature tends to lapse into patriotic and apologetic tones,” there are also signs that we should be optimistic because of the increasing numbers of Chinese Cold War scholars attempting to be more objective in their own studies and the more rigorous treatment of archival sources. They consider themselves to be “scholars” rather than “apologists.” Luthi correctly observes that “the lack of citations of quotes from documents or the character-by-character duplication of pages from other publications without quotation marks or footnotes referencing the original source” is common in Chinese academic circles. However, in the last several years, many leading Chinese history journals, such as *Lishi yanjiu* [Historical Studies], *Shijie Lishi* [World History], *Shixue yuekan* [History Monthly] and *Lengzhan guojishi yanjiu* [Cold War International History Studies] now publish articles that conform to western methodological standards. Attempts to adopt a more rigorous scholarly approach is readily apparent in books by the younger generation of Chinese Cold War scholars.

Xiaobing Li believes it an advantage that “Chinese historians today no longer have to read a hard copy of the diplomatic documents” because “a large portion of the archives of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs have become digital and accessible on computer.” Xiaoyuan Liu is concerned that “the Chinese way does not give the researcher any clue about what files have been withheld and remain classified.” During my research at the Chinese Foreign Ministry archives in the summer of 2006, I personally shared Liu's frustration. While I appreciate Liu's expanded discussion and insight “about a suggested research agenda for the future,” I see no contradiction between my statement “that although Chinese researchers should continue to devote most of their attention to China-related issues during the Cold War, the development of the field of Cold War studies in the PRC requires that they also contribute to the latest scholarship on other issues” and Liu's observation that “Chinese scholars have the responsibility for throwing new light on China's Cold War experience more than on any other subject matters.” Liu, Luthi and I agree that it is imperative that there be more substantial collaboration between Chinese and non-Chinese Cold War scholars in the future.

Xiaoyuan Liu correctly points out that “those leading Chinese scholars named in Xia's article, including Li Danhui, Niu Jun, Shen Zhihua, Yang Kuisong, Zhang Baijia, and others have admirably produced independent-minded works in this regard.” He also cautions that “there remain reasons for concern that such a path has not been widely taken among Cold War scholars in the PRC, especially by the younger generation.” I personally have seen promise in the work of some of the younger Chinese Cold War scholars, such as Dai

Chaowu, Zhao Xuegong, Deng Feng, He Hui and others. Hopefully, they will have ever increasing opportunities to attend international conferences and engage in international academic dialogue with western scholars.

The recent increased financial backing of Cold War studies in China, especially the new Cold War studies center at East China Normal University is a positive indication of the Chinese government's increased interest. In the last two years, Cold War study centers in Beijing University and East China Normal University received large grants for research projects and conferences from the Chinese Ministry of Education. East China Normal University has spent more than 3.6 million Chinese yuan (equal to US \$ 500,000) on the acquisition of foreign documents, and much more on the capital construction of its new Center for Cold War International History Studies. In 2007, the Ministry of Education also initiated a new funding program to sponsor doctoral students in social sciences and humanities at leading Chinese universities to come to the U.S. and other Western countries to pursue one-year doctoral study or for short term training (such as the Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research organized by George Washington University's Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies). Several Chinese students specializing in Cold War studies have benefited from participation in these programs.

Finally, to repeat, my warm thanks to the reviewers and the editor for their attention to this article.

## ERRATUM

In my article "The Study of Cold War International History in China—A Review of the Last Twenty Years," I wrote "The (Shanghai) center has created a website ([www.coldwarchina.org](http://www.coldwarchina.org)) for disseminating information and presenting the research results ..." (p. 84) The correct website is [www.coldwarchina.com](http://www.coldwarchina.com). This mistake has been repeated in the recently published *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Issue 16, Fall 2007/Winter 2008, p. 2).

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