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Introduction by Tom Nichols, U.S. Naval War College

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Introduction by Tom Nichols, U.S. Naval War College

The last volume of the remarkable *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (*CHCW*) series is titled, appropriately, “Endings.” It is something of a misnomer, as the reviewers point out; there are many entries that are not about the end of the Cold War itself, but about events and places that were part of the final years of the United States’ great global conflict with the Soviet Union. This last volume ranges across significant territory and a variety of issues, not all of which neatly fall into an encyclopedic examination of the Cold’s War end. Nonetheless, this third entry in the *CHCW* series is one of the most valuable and comprehensive looks at the end of the Cold War in the literature today.

The volume’s contents recount important events and times with great (and welcome) attention to relevance rather than theory. The reviewers of the third volume in places disagree with each other about the nature of the interpretations of the chapter authors, and about what was selected or left for analysis, but this is to be expected: a full history of the Cold War cannot be a discrete history of a particular war. A truly comprehensive history would necessarily be an all-encompassing look at daily life, culture, social environments, and politics around the world, a domain of topics too broad and too interdisciplinary to contain in any one set of volumes. The editors of the *CHCW* made difficult choices, and disagreement over those selections is part of the intellectual contribution that sets the stage for further work.

With that said, “Endings” does have a central focus, and it is necessarily on the questions that still vex all of us who study the Cold War: Why did it end, why did it end the way it did, and who was responsible for its end?

This last question raises hackles in many quarters. Some, of course, credit the Americans, and particularly President Ronald Reagan, with the Soviet collapse; others argue that Soviet internal processes brought the ostensibly indispensable Mikhail Gorbachev to power. The answers, as far as the most dedicated partisans of each camp are concerned, are so obvious as to be almost beneath debating. But no amount of scholarly condescension about “Fort Sumter history,” or emotional imagery of speeches in front of the Berlin Wall can obviate those natural questions. The Cold War took us by surprise, corroded our lives (even if it spurred us, as wars often do, to great heights of human achievement), and ended with the complete eradication of one side’s ideology, alliance system, and way of life. How it started is fairly well-understood (at least for most people, academics or otherwise), and how it shaped the conduct of our daily lives is still a living memory for many of us. How it ended, and why, is still something of a mystery – a puzzle compounded by a shameful lack of intellectual curiosity that has been noted elsewhere, including on H-DIPLO.¹ And yet, “Endings,” like its reviewers, manages to approach this important question without unnecessary fireworks, the result both of deft editing and the inclusion of a spectrum of views.

¹ Bill Wohlforth raised this in the very first issue of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, which I reviewed on H-DIPLO. The review is archived at <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/comment4.htm>.

The reviewers note some common threads in the volume, including attention to the startling turnabout that took place between the superpowers in the decade between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. In 1975, the Soviet Union was riding high and the United States was supposedly in the grip of “decline,” but by 1985, the U.S. and NATO reached virtually supreme heights of economic and military power and the USSR began its accelerating descent into oblivion. Scott Lucas rightly notes how “jarring” it is to locate the “crisis of the West” in the 1970s, when in the 2010s the Western crisis seems wider and deeper than before. Robert English zeroes in on Nancy Mitchell’s examination of the Carter era – an understudied Cold War subject, in my view – and her wonder at how fears of U.S. weakness circa 1980 could be so wrong. Joseph Siracusa’s review dwells at more length on this period, and he centers on the issue of whether U.S. pressure had much of an effect on whether the Communist Party leadership could reform the Soviet system and stave off disaster.

There is evidence for many interpretations in “Endings,” with some grain of truth likely in all of them. Siracusa and the other reviewers are understandably alert to monocausal explanations that give credit for the Cold War’s end *either* to the Americans *or* to the Soviets, as the temptation to “inevitability” arguments tends to dog many great historical debates. Still, overall the reviews (reflecting the major trend in the chapters) lean more toward a Soviet-centric explanation. The late Ilya Gaiduk, English, and Siracusa focus on Archie Brown’s contribution, for example, about the domestic political environment in Moscow at the end of the Cold War, with English agreeing that Gorbachev played a “vital” role. And so he did – but what role did American pressure on the Kremlin delay the emergence of a reformist bloc in the leadership, and thus either prolong or shorten the Cold War? English and Gaiduk also note the chapters by Beth Fischer and Vladislav Zubok that present a more textured view of superpower interaction.

Other influences are also taken into account in “Endings.” Siracusa and Dina Fainberg rightly bring our attention to David Reynolds’s contribution on science and technology, noting that capitalism may have undermined communism if only by creating an “information revolution” that was a deadly threat to Soviet political control. (Despite my own affection for technology, I am forced to admit that I completely underestimated the impact of communications technology on the Soviet collapse at the time. I now hope that Apple and Microsoft are far tougher liberalizers than Vladimir Putin realizes.) Likewise, English admires Alex Pravda’s chapter on nationalism – although again, any explanation of the rise of anti-Soviet nationalism must account for the weakening of the Soviet immune system to resist it.

Lucas, however, criticizes “Endings” for falling into a standard narrative of the Cold War that treats states, groups, and conflicts on what used to be called “the periphery” as mere “props” – he is referring to John Coatsworth’s chapter – “for a narrative on U.S. policy.” This objection indirectly raises the issue, explored in the recent debate on H-DIPLO, about the degree to which modern historians retroactively impose their judgments on the subjects of their study.

If the Third World emerges from these accounts as a narrative in which “areas of the world,” as Lucas writes, just “disappear,” is that because of an omission by the editors and authors – which seems to be Lucas’s *a priori* position – or is it because of the way the Cold War’s protagonists experienced the conflict themselves? Anatoly Dobrynin, for example, in his 1995 memoirs, admitted that Soviet leaders “flattered” themselves with “involvement in faraway conflicts,” and noted that “in retrospect, I cannot help being surprised at the amount of energy and effort spent almost entirely in vain by Moscow and Washington on these so-called African affairs. Twenty years later, no one (except historians) could as much as remember them.”² Concerning Vietnam, Ilya Gaiduk himself in 1996 called it “strange and inexplicable that the interests of the great powers could clash in this small country which played so minimal a role in the strategic balance of forces at the time.”³ If those regions seemed of lesser importance to Dobrynin and the Politburo, it is reasonable to ask whether historians should insist on contradicting that recollection.

Finally, some of the reviewers note the grand attempts by John Ikenberry and Adam Roberts to impose some kind of interpretive order on the final era of the Cold War, a gigantic task that receives mixed reviews. Lucas, in keeping with his objection to what might be called a Northern Hemispheric focus on the Cold War, criticizes Ikenberry for seeing other regions of the world as “merely the walk-ons for his admiration of a Cold War stage which starred U.S. pre-eminence,” and which serve only to emphasize Ikenberry’s “concern over the loss of that proscenium Gaiduk and English are rather kinder, but in any event, Ikenberry’s chapter will likely become a standard reading for students of the Cold War.

All of the reviewers, even with some of the harshest criticisms, see this volume as an achievement. And it is: all three volumes of the *CHCW* cover a breadth of subject, and represent a depth of effort, unlikely to be duplicated during the careers of most current scholars of the Cold War. The reviewers are not uniformly admiring of Cambridge’s final product, but it would be a worry if they were: the Cold War is too large, too controversial, too charged with drama and emotion, for any group of authors to reach unity. Rather than strive for agreement, Leffler and Westad let the scholars in the field of twenty-first century Cold War history speak for themselves. We have waited a long time for a standard and usable reference on the Cold War that provides a solid foundation for the beginning student or general reader, while offering avenues for further research for the more advanced scholar. And now – and for some time to come – we have it.

Participants:

Odd Arne Westad is professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Among his books are *The Global Cold War* (2005), which won the Bancroft Prize, and *Decisive Encounters* (2003), a standard history of the Chinese civil

² Anatolii Dobrynin, *In Confidence* (Seattle: University of Washington Press), p. 407.

³ Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. xi

war. His new book is *Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750*, which will be published in 2012.

Melvyn P. Leffler is Edward Stettinius Professor of American History at the University of Virginia and a Faculty Associate of the Governing America in a Global Era Program at the Miller Center. Among his books are *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman administration, and the Cold War* (1993), which won the Bancroft Prize, and *For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (2008), which won the Beer Prize. Most recently, he is the co-editor, with Jeff Legro, of *In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11* (2011).

Tom Nichols is Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, and adjunct professor at the Harvard Extension School. He is a senior associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, and a former fellow of the International Security Program at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. His most recent book was *Eve of Destruction: The Coming Age of Preventive War* (Univ. of Penn., 2008) and his next book, *No Use: Nuclear Weapons and the Reform of American Security Strategy*, will be published by Penn Press in 2012.

Robert D. English teaches in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University, and is author among other works of *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, 2000). He is currently writing a biography of Gorbachev as well as completing a monograph titled *Our Serbian Brethren: History, Myth, and the Politics of Russia's Balkan Diplomacy*.

Dina Fainberg is a Ph.D. Candidate at the History Department, Rutgers University. Her dissertation, "Notes from the Rotten West, Reports from the Backward East, Soviet and American Cold War Correspondents, 1953-1980," explores the work and the private lives of journalists who crossed the Iron Curtain to cover the rival superpowers during the Cold War. Her publications include "The Heirs of the Future: Foreign Correspondents Meeting Youth on the Other Side of the Iron Curtain," in: Sari Autio-Saraso and Brendan Humphreys (eds.), *Winter Kept Us Warm: Cold War Interactions Reconsidered* (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2010); and "Ordinary Russians and Average Americans: How Cold War Foreign Correspondents Constructed "Regular People" on the Other Side of the Iron Curtain," in: Eva Maria Stolberg (ed.), *Rivals of the Twentieth Century": USSR and USA. Two Geopolitical Powers in Competition* (forthcoming 2011).

Ilya V. Gaiduk passed away on 5 September 2011. He was Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, and is the author of three books, which include *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996) and *Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963* (Washington: Wilson Center Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) as well as a number of other publications on Soviet foreign policy and U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. His unfinished project, which will be prepared for publication by his colleagues, involves U.S. and Soviet policy toward the United Nations during the Cold War.

Scott Lucas is Professor of American Studies at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. A specialist in U.S. and British foreign policy, he has written and edited seven books, more than 30 major articles, and a radio documentary and co-directed the 2007 film *Laban!* He is also the founder of EA WorldView (www.enduringamerica.com), one of the leading sites in the world for news and analysis of U.S. foreign policy and international affairs. In addition to running EA WorldView, Professor Lucas is working on a book re-interpreting the history of U.S. foreign policy since 1945.

Joseph Siracusa is Professor of Human Security and International Diplomacy and Associate Dean of International and Justice Studies, at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Australia. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Colorado (Boulder). He is internationally known for his writings on the Cold War, presidential politics, and global security. Professor Siracusa is also a frequent political affairs commentator in the Australian media. Among his numerous books are *A History of United States Foreign Policy* (4th ed., with Julius W. Pratt and Vincent De Santis); *Depression to Cold War: A History of America from Herbert Hoover to Ronald Reagan* (with David G. Coleman); *Presidential Profiles: The Kennedy Years*; *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy* (with David G. Coleman); *Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction*; *Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War* (with Norman A. Graebner and Richard Dean Burns); *America and the Cold War, 1941-1991: A Realist Interpretation* (2 vols., with Norman A. Graebner and Richard Dean Burns); *Globalization & Human Security* (with Paul Battersby); and *Crime Wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law* (with Paul Battersby).

Review by Robert D. English, University of Southern California

A large collection (in this case, 25 chapters totaling 556 pages) grouped around a central theme or historical epoch (the late Cold War and its denouement, covering roughly the 1970s and 1980s) can be reviewed in as many ways as it might be approached by prospective readers. One is as a reference work, i.e. a compilation of chapters each of which presents a thorough treatment of its individual subject, giving the student or researcher who might not necessarily be interested in the project's totality a balanced, up-to-date overview of that particular subject or aspect of the Cold War. A second approach is more holistic, namely an evaluation of the chapters in toto for both their completeness and integration in illuminating—again, on the basis of the latest evidence—the most important historical developments and most contentious interpretive debates about “what mattered most” to the Cold War's end. A third approach is even more demanding, asking that the historian's perspective be paired with that of the political scientist in highlighting the methodological and theoretical positions at issue in these debates and, at least implicitly, posing counterfactual questions to aid in assessing competing economic, social, ideational, and leadership-based arguments about the underlying causes of this “tectonic shift” in international relations and history.¹

Perhaps paradoxically, it is in the first, ostensibly easiest of these tasks, that *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III: Endings* is least impressive. That is, it is as a reference work of potentially stand-alone chapters that the reviewer finds most to fault. Otherwise strong selections on background regional, economic, or intellectual trends are marred by various mistakes, omissions, and often too-deterministic arguments in efforts to locate and elevate their subjects' importance among the multitude of factors that contributed to the Cold War's end. Michael Schaller's “Japan and the Cold War,” is largely focused on U.S.-Japanese relations with comparatively little exploration of Tokyo's policy in Asia or, more importantly, of the complex socio-economic and political changes in Japan itself that shaped its foreign policy. Jan-Werner Muller's fine overview of “The Cold War and the intellectual history” is primarily concerned with elite philosophical-ideological currents—chiefly, the demise of the “old left” and rise of various “neoconservative” ideas—rather than those currents' grounding in larger societal (i.e., mass-level) changes, both East and West. Giovanni Arrighi's “The world economy and the Cold War” traces global economic changes (from the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system and crisis of “social Keynesianism,” to the triumph of Reagan-Thatcher monetarism, privatization, and deregulation) as background to the “neoliberal (counter) revolution” that also drastically affected development strategies and aid (24, 36). Yet the impact of the “Washington Consensus” on North-South relations is subordinated to East-West issues, wherein the growing economic woes of the Soviet-bloc countries are well described but probably overstated—particularly the supposed decisive impact of a new, high-tech arms race on the USSR's eventual demise (39). At a minimum, in support of this claim readers would benefit more from a review of specialists' debates on economic factors in the inception of Gorbachev's domestic and

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

foreign-policy reforms than a discursus on the failures of the Japanese developmental model.

“Decisive” or “critical” impact is also claimed for trends in other areas. Chen Jian’s “China and the Cold War after Mao” offers a splendid overview of domestic political and socio-economic change but overstates the “dramatic” global power shift engendered by Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s (83). It did not, in fact, prompt a rapid redirection in U.S. military resources away from the PRC and toward confronting, and exhausting, the USSR. Neither did an alternative Chinese socialist model—nor Third-World disillusion with *any* socialist model, thanks to Moscow-Beijing rivalry—significantly alter the trajectory of the developing world. Indeed, an uninformed reader of this chapter could easily conclude that the Sino-Soviet split largely *followed* Sino-American accord rather than preceding it by over a decade. The claims advanced in John Young’s “Western Europe and the End of the Cold War” are rather more judicious but still ultimately and perhaps excessively shaped by the goal of highlighting their impact on the Cold War and its ending. Notwithstanding an excellent analysis of West European domestic and foreign-policy change over the 1960s and early 1970s—from the success of social-democratic development, to the rise of *Ostpolitik*—it is doubtful that European stagnation of the late 1970s “created an impression that Soviet communism was as successful as Western capitalism” (291). Similarly, the rebounding West European economies of the 1980s did not suddenly give rise to a “thriving liberal-democratic bastion” subversively located on Eastern Europe’s “doorstep” (290). A better argument would have examined more closely the relations of a prosperous, integrating Europe on specific countries such as East Germany or Poland. It might also highlight its effect on Moscow—not only as a subversive threat to be feared (by hardline “old thinkers”) but as an attractive model to be emulated (by Soviet reformers and “new thinkers,” eventually to include Mikhail Gorbachev himself).

An important argument is made concerning Europe’s impact on the U.S., including both Europeans’ preference for trade and détente with the East as well as Europe’s solidarity with Washington over the “Euromissile” crisis of the early 1980s. Yet this section is marred by a series of mistakes (Gorbachev’s predecessor Konstantin Chernenko died in 1985, not 1984; Gorbachev accepted the Euromissile “zero option” in late 1987, not January 1986; Gorbachev released Soviet political prisoners in 1986, not 1989; etc.). Similar problems plague Amin Saikal’s “Islamism, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.” Again, an otherwise illuminating essay on Iran and Afghanistan over the mid-to-late Cold War decades is weakened by claims about their perception and impact on Moscow and Washington that are often simplistic, outdated, sometimes clearly wrong and nearly always unsupported by references that would enable the reader to check the source of those assertions or follow up on relevant literature. This chapter, like all, is supplemented by a bibliographic essay at the volume’s end—yet this hardly makes up for a near-total lack of citations to recent sources in support of important or controversial claims.

Other “regional” chapters are stronger—more balanced, up-to-date, and treating their subjects comprehensively in their own right without overemphasizing their “decisive” impact on the Cold War’s end. Silvio Pons’ “The rise and fall of Eurocommunism” usefully

reaches back to the late 1940s in tracing the origins and evolution of the French, Spanish, and Italian communist parties whose post-Prague Spring (1968) alienation from Moscow briefly raised the specter of a *sonderweg* in Europe. The movement, which probably peaked (together with *détente*) in 1976 when the Italian communists won a third of the national vote, was never fully consistent or unified. It was also opposed by Washington and Moscow alike, both preferring the predictability of “bipolar stability” (52). But while bipolar rivalry “brought stability in Europe, it made for instability and increasingly ‘hot war’ in southern Africa,” write Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow in “The Cold War and southern Africa” (241-242.). It did so by heightening ideological differences, militarizing, and essentially ‘globalizing’ what were fundamentally domestic socio-economic and racial cleavages. The same occurred in Central America, particularly after the collapse of *détente* and advent of the Reagan Administration with its heightened fear of communist expansion and increased support of far-right leaders and movements. As John Coatsworth’s “The Cold War in Central America” notes, “the numbers of political prisoners, torture victims, and executions of nonviolent political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded” those in the Soviet bloc over the middle-late Cold War decades (221).

This brings us to the late 1970s-early 1980s, the Cold War’s final crises and the subject of this volume’s main chapters on the central issues and actors in the Cold War’s end. Washington’s exaggerated alarm at perceived communist gains from Central America to the Horn of Africa—as well as in the arms race—are analyzed in Nancy Mitchell’s excellent “The Cold War and Jimmy Carter.” “The striking feature of the widespread perception of American weakness in 1980 is how wrong it was,” at least relative to the USSR, but “in an age of deterrence, perception was reality” (67). That perception was distorted by oil shocks and inflation, hostages in Iran, and of course a relentless anti-*détente* lobby. For their part, once-confident Soviet leaders were, by this time, equally paranoid about American gains as seen in episodes from their essentially *defensive* invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to their near-panic over a feared imminent U.S. nuclear attack in 1983. Yet while chronicling Moscow’s fears and misperceptions, Vlad Zubok’s “Soviet foreign policy from *détente* to Gorbachev” ultimately stresses ideological (the “revolutionary-imperial paradigm”) and institutional (a powerful military-industrial complex, paired with a rigid, hidebound policy process) factors that doomed *détente* from the Soviet side. Zubok’s argument in this sense is mirrored by Olav Njolstad whose “Collapse of superpower *détente*” emphasizes anti-Soviet institutional and ideological forces on the U.S. side that highlight how fragile—and lacking a common understanding—*détente* was from the outset.

Yet these authors avoid excessive determinism, posing implicit and sometimes explicit counterfactual questions about the roles of leadership and contingency: What if Nixon had not resigned in scandal in 1973 (a turn that baffled and frightened Moscow, as well as propelling Carter to the presidency) or if Carter had approached arms control and human rights more cautiously (instead of with the grand ambitions that soon backfired in both areas)? What if the USSR had had an even slightly more pragmatic, flexible leadership (instead of the sclerotic, blinkered Politburo of the late 1970s-early 1980s)?

Yet it was not merely generational change that enabled Soviet reform and unfroze superpower relations in the mid-1980s. As Archie Brown has long argued—here, in a splendid essay on “The Gorbachev revolution” that refines his earlier work based on new archival sources—Gorbachev was both unique (among leadership candidates) and uniquely vital (to the inception and especially the continuation and radicalization of these reforms, domestic and foreign).² Thus the importance of personality and the ideational “pull,” as well as economic “push,” behind perestroika and new thinking. Here Zubok and especially Matthew Evangelista agree, the latter contributing an excellent chapter on “Transnational organizations and the Cold War” that examines the growth of international scientists’ and humanitarians’ groups as well as their influence on future Soviet reformers, including Gorbachev. Ronald Reagan was obviously a key actor as well, whose own “anti-nuclearism” gained the upper hand in his second presidential term and facilitated sweeping arms-control agreements as well as a deeper trust that were singularly important in the Cold War’s sudden end. Yet as Beth Fischer argues in “U.S. foreign policy under Ronald Reagan and George Bush”—an essay that explicitly weighs competing perspectives on the Cold War’s end—the Americans’ role “was clearly secondary. Reagan became more conciliatory, but Gorbachev revolutionized his country’s foreign policy. Bush supported Gorbachev, but his propensity for prudence paled in comparison to Gorbachev’s bold initiatives” (288). Zubok concurs, adding that U.S. pressure was secondary to domestic factors in the launch of Gorbachev’s reforms, and far from deserving primary credit, Reagan was extremely lucky to have the “enlightened” Gorbachev as a partner (111).

Jacques Levesque, in his chapter on “The East European Revolutions of 1989” essentially agrees. While emphasizing that Gorbachev’s policy toward Eastern Europe certainly evolved over time and under pressure of events, he stresses that what ultimately mattered most was not so much the East Europeans’ push for freedom—that had long existed—but rather Gorbachev’s tolerance for democratic change. Helga Haftendorn contributes a solid chapter on “The unification of Germany.” One only wishes that a broader, more current analysis of its security dimensions had been included; the claim that “a new European structure was built...in which neither of the Cold War superpowers would dominate the new Europe” (355) appears somewhat quaint in light of more recent events.³ The volume’s final “core” chapter is Alex Pravda’s on “The collapse of the Soviet Union.” A superb analysis of how nationalism grew and eventually sundered the USSR—which, like Fischer’s chapter on U.S. policy, explicitly assesses rival interpretations—it notes how Soviet federalism set the structure which local elites (non-communist, and eventually communist too) exploited via Gorbachev’s expanding glasnost and democratization. International factors were important as well—the legitimization of human rights and self-determination that came with international “new thinking,” and soon enough the inspiration of East European success. Also, as in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev’s rejection of the use of major force—the “most remarkable feature” of nationalism’s triumph—was decisive (369).

² Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996).

³ See Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: *The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

In reflecting on this chapter, and on the core sections of this volume as a whole, the only missing element is a closer treatment of economic origins. Pravda's analysis only takes the case up in detail in 1987-1988, when a sharp economic decline had already begun and the story of nationalist mobilization perhaps indeed became primarily political (though a strong counterfactual case could be made that, in better economic circumstances, separatism's mass appeal would have been far weaker). More broadly, this collection could have benefited from a separate chapter focused on the domestic politics and especially economics of Gorbachev's reforms. Though covered in passing in several chapters, a detailed treatment of Gorbachev's embrace of ever-greater glasnost—and eventually genuine democratization—is lacking. The same is true of the economics of perestroika—the fate of early “acceleration” measures as well as that of subsequent economic efforts, and their impact on both political and international reforms that followed. The present author has long been skeptical of “economic crisis made radical domestic reforms and rapid international retreat inevitable” arguments.⁴ But the case deserves to be made comprehensively by its advocates, not only dismissed by its critics.

The “concluding” chapters—by David Reynolds on “Science, technology, and the Cold War,” J.R. McNeill on “The biosphere,” Rosemary Foot on “Human rights,” Matthew Connelly on “Global migration, public health, and population control,” and Emily Rosenberg on “Consumer capitalism”—return to broader themes of international social, political, and other changes that accompanied or resulted from the long Cold War. They are excellent, comprehensive, and illuminate important transformations not normally included in a volume on the Cold War. Only occasionally do they overreach in the fashion of some of the early chapters criticized above—such as in crediting the agricultural “Green Revolution” in large measure to the Cold War rivalry (426-428), or, conversely, in arguing that “technological development fueled the Cold-War arms race” more than the reverse (372). The volume ends, fittingly, with “Reflections on the end of the Cold War” by Adam Roberts and “Restructuring of the international system” by G. John Ikenberry. The former, drawing largely on the volume's other chapters, concisely summarizes and assesses the most prominent explanations of this “most remarkable case of large-scale peaceful change in world history” (532). The latter looks to the future, pondering the surprises, disappointments, and challenges in a confusing new era of simultaneous unipolarity, globalization, and religious fundamentalism. The Cold War, for all its tremendous costs, ordered global politics, ensured a degree of stability, and suppressed many conflicts in both the developed and developing world. Though Ikenberry remains hopeful, the Cold War's end has so far not brought the “end of history” nor ushered in the global triumph of liberal democracy.

All in all, notwithstanding its noted weaknesses, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III: Endings* is a superb collection. Especially if paired with a strong narrative-

⁴ Robert English, “Perestroika without politics: how realism misunderstands the Cold War's end,” in Gay Goertz and Jack S. Levy, eds., *Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

analytical history that highlights key interpretive debates and draws on recent sources—such as John Harper’s just-published *The Cold War*—novice and specialist readers alike will have the collected information and concentrated wisdom of an entire library at their disposal.⁵

⁵ John Lamberton Harper, *The Cold War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Like its two predecessors, the third installment of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War (CHCW)*, is scholar's and instructor's dream for it provides well organized chapters covering major issues in the research of the late Cold War period, all delivered by leading historians in the field. Since no review can do justice to such an array of topics my essay will focus on chapters exploring the Cold War from a transnational perspective. The contributions under this rubric utilize relatively new historiographical developments and move their prism away from the nation states, focusing on broader international developments and actors that have been previously excluded from the story. Combined together, they add an additional, and very important perspective to our understanding of the final stages of the Cold War and its aftermath.

David Reynolds examines science, technology, and the Cold War focusing primarily on transistors, satellites, and computers. The superpower competition, he writes, facilitated an intensive investment in security technologies on both sides of the Iron Curtain, creating, what he calls, the "governmental - industrial - academic complex". However, he points out, different economic system of each superpower dictated their particular mode of investment in technology and research as well as the patterns of technological development. In the market-driven American economy the defense industry was an important part, and often an initiator of change, but never the dominator. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, state control over academic research and the absence of a market put defense and military at the heart of scientific development, while entirely neglecting consumer needs. As a result, whereas in the U.S. many consumer and everyday technologies developed as spin-offs from military projects, the Soviet Union was constantly lagging behind. The field where these differences mattered the most was that of computers and information. IBM, in Reynolds' story, is the primary example of how American military-inspired technologies were adapted to civilian use and the consumer market. Although the first large IBM contract was for the USAF, as early as 1957 it was already computerizing the reservations system for American Airlines.

The inauguration of the information society in which we live today, Reynolds points out, was the offshoot of capitalism and information became yet another marketable commodity. Coming at the end of the 1970s stagnation in North America, Western Europe and Japan, the technological revolution was a source for capitalist regeneration. It changed our ways of doing business (stock exchange) creating a more connected, more globalized world (transatlantic cable). As we are now on the top of (a second wave of?) information revolution, Reynolds' chapter provides interesting explanations of how the current information world came about and its relationship to the Cold War.

For the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the information revolution was a source of collapse. In a world which emphasized consumer technology, information, and computers, the USSR couldn't keep up relying on old-style heavy industry and resources. The growing availability of alternative media channels made it virtually impossible to isolate the citizens of the Eastern Block. The events of 1989, argues Reynolds at the end of his chapter, owe

their speed primarily to the technological revolution. Reynolds points out several reasons for the Soviet inability to catch up with the new technological developments: the tradition of segregating scientists from society by creating special “gated scientific communities” and deployment of science only for security industries; underestimation of the importance of civil industries and information technology and lack of markets that would drive these development; and finally, the regime’s fear of information because of its subversive potential. Perhaps because of the focus on computers and transistors, the chapter depicts Soviet scientists as almost entirely isolated from their society and segregated from the international discussions in their field and deprived of international exchange.

An entirely different picture of the Soviet scientists emerges from Matthew Evangelista’s exploration of transnational organizations in the Cold War. In his narrative, scientists occupied a very significant place in the East-West international dialogue, the origins of which he dates to Khrushchev’s Thaw. Evangelista tells the story of the Conference on Science and World Affairs, otherwise known as the Pugwash movement, which grew to be a truly international organization, bringing together scientists from the USSR and the U.S. in an attempt to cap the superpowers’ arms race. Other Pugwash movement spinoffs, like the Soviet-American Disarmament Study Group and Dartmouth Conferences featured exchange and discussion among scientists and played an important role during the Brezhnev era, and continued to operate even when the superpowers began formal disarmament talks. Scientists constituted the core of transnational movement to slow the arms race during the early 1980s before the nomination of Mikhail Gorbachev. Overall, Evangelista points out, these transnational organizations laid the foundations for many important formal arms-control initiatives and maintained the ongoing international dialogue about arms reduction each time the official efforts stalled.

Although very important, scientists’ organizations were just one facet of transnational movements in the late Cold War. In addition, Evangelista mentions such organizations as the Palme Commission (The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), comprised of prominent political figures from countries around the world and the continent-wide European Nuclear Disarmament Movement (END) that aimed to link the campaign for peace with issues of human rights. In contrast to encouragement/acceptance of international forums involving politicians and scientists, the Soviet authorities were alarmed with the latter initiative, first because of its refusal to adopt a pro-Soviet stance and second because of its support for Soviet and Eastern European peace and human rights activists.

Human Rights movements are explored in great length in Rosemary Foot’s contribution to the volume. Each superpower’s insistence on stressing the human rights violations caused by the other made human rights an important issue in the Cold War contestation and, in fact, created an international climate in which groups and individuals were able to push the states to “promote political and legal change related to those values.” The superpowers’ insistence on human rights in their propaganda statements notwithstanding, both were complacent in gross human rights violations, while justifying their actions with security rhetoric. At the same time, human rights-focused Cold War propaganda often had a

restraining effect domestically, most importantly affecting American civil rights legislation helping to dismantle Jim Crow laws and providing reinforcement to the antiwar movement.

For human rights activists in the Soviet block the watershed was the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet Union and Warsaw pact countries considered the human rights provisions as a mere lip service and were therefore very surprised when activists around the Soviet bloc began to monitor their states' compliance with the provisions and to publicize instances of violation. Circulating these cases around the world through samizdat and international media, human rights activists from the Soviet bloc inspired their sympathizers in the West to push their governments and diplomats to insist upon protection of human rights in their negotiations with the USSR.

Toward the end of her chapter Foot suggests that Helsinki groups helped the development of Gorbachev's reforms. While dissidents clearly played an important role in the 1989 revolutions in the Warsaw Pact countries, the extent of their influence in the Soviet Union was more limited. As Archie Brown's contribution on Gorbachev's Revolution in this same volume shows, the core of Gorbachev's team did not come from the ranks of the human rights or dissident movements but from among the younger and more reform-minded party and state apparatchiks.¹ Alexey Yurchak's excellent study on the last Soviet generation points out that dissidents had a very limited influence inside Soviet society, and were treated by their contemporaries with a mixture of weariness and puzzlement.²

While Rosemary Foot's article underlines the importance of human rights discourse in the superpower competition, Emily Rosenberg's contribution shows the prominent place occupied by consumerism and discourse on living standards: "both sides framed the Cold War as a debate over which system will outproduce and lift standards more effectively and humanely than the other".³ Rosenberg shows how during the Cold War American ideas of consumerism gradually spread throughout the world, establishing new standards of living and stimulating desires for new goods. In the process, however, these conceptions of consumption turned from essentially American into universal and multi-cultural through local adaptations and accommodation. In fact, she argues, this "multilocalisation" of American consumerism and the gradual disassociation between consumerism and Americanism is what allowed it to spread more or less uninterrupted. No longer associated exclusively with the U.S., skillfully adapted to local cultures and customs, the gospel of consumption secured its place in the world, "and those on the Left and Right who still tried to identify mass consumption solely with Americanization found themselves increasingly

¹ Archie Brown, "Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* Volume III, Endings, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 244-266—hereafter cited as *CHCW*.

² Alexey Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More. The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 102-108.

³ Emily Rosenberg, "Consumer Capitalism and the End of the Cold War," *CHCW*, 502

irrelevant.”⁴. Yet, Rosenberg concludes, the conceptual divorce between consumerism and Americanism was relatively short-lived, and since the 1990s we see an increasing number of speakers denouncing the corrupting effects of consumerism and identifying it as an essentially American evil.

Emily Rosenberg’s concept of “multilocalisation” of consumerism points to interesting directions for further research. How was consumption represented in the socialist countries? What aspects it emphasized? What ideals and dreams did it promote?⁵ A multifaceted approach, which considers the resistance to consumerism as well as its perceptions across different cultures, will further help us in transcending the celebratory narrative of an Iron Curtain collapsing under the weight of McDonald’s, Mickey Mouse and supermarkets.

Additional suggestions for new directions in research of the Cold War’s global impact are proposed in Matthew Connelly’s chapter on population management and J.R. McNail’s chapter the Cold War and biosphere. Connelly invites his readers to consider the global impact of the Cold War era by looking at international collaboration in questions of population control. It is in this field, Connelly insists that the global impact of the Cold War is the largest and will remain the most durable. Although population management has been a long-lasting heritage of modernity and empires, the shape it assumed in the last sixty years was influenced primarily by the Cold War competition. With each superpower presenting itself as an alternative modernization project, international policies in the realm of population management such as migration, public health, and family planning campaigns were shaped through collaboration and debates within international agencies and between competing advocacy groups and values. As Connelly points out, the very term “Third World” originally developed in a population management debate, but caught on only because of the geopolitical developments in the superpower struggle.

Connelly argues that it is impossible to assess the impact of the Cold War on history without considering it in a global perspective, and indeed examination of the Cold War’s effect on population management is a welcome, and long needed addition to the field. However, he admits, in population policies it is rather hard to separate the influences of the Cold War from other contemporary social, cultural and religious sensibilities: “when it came to population problems the world was not divided by Cold War rivalries, but rather by transnational movements that sought to shape the domestic and foreign policies of every state.”⁶

⁴ *Ibid.*, 503-504.

⁵ A panel on the Soviet 1960s at the 2010 Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) convention provided excellent examples for the fascinating studies made by cultural historians of the Soviet Union in that direction: Dianne P. Koenker, “Mad Men in Moscow: Sex and Style in the Soviet 1960s” and Susan E. Reid, “Making Oneself at Home in the Soviet Sixties” (papers presented at the National Convention of Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), Los Angeles, California, November 18-21, 2010.

⁶ Matthew Connelly, “The Cold War in the *longue duree*,” in *CHCW*, 474.

J.R. McNeill's examination of Cold War's impact on the biosphere outlines the very tangible impacts of the superpower competition on the environment worldwide. Focusing on three important spheres -- agriculture, transportation, and nuclear power -- McNail describes how they were affected by the global superpower contest for superiority, and how the changes caused an irreversible damage to the environment on the global scale. For example, to win the worldwide battle for hearts and minds, each side had to demonstrate the ability to care for the "ordinary man" by providing cheap food for as many people as possible. The resulting Green Revolution introduced scientific innovations in chemistry, machinery, and agricultural practices that helped to increase the crops' yields. By-products of this process – adoption of pesticides and construction of dams to facilitate irrigation – completely changed the biosphere. McNail's contribution illuminates an almost neglected aspect of the Cold War, and perhaps one of its most important and most lethal consequences. Interestingly, contemporary activism for environment protection also owes its origins to the Cold War, for the environmentalist movements first rose to prominence in conjuncture with the anti-nuclear activism in the 1970s.

Taken together the contributions explored above illuminate the global and international impacts of the Cold War and the important influence its heritage continues to exercise on the contemporary world. The Superpowers' competition affected not just international politics and the armament race, but also such diverse areas as information, living standards, family planning, and the biosphere. At the same time, the superpowers' conception of the entire world as an arena of their battle for hearts and minds made people around the globe realize that despite boundaries and differences, they shared common interests and could unite for a common cause across diverse places and cultures.

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The third volume of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War (CHCW)* expands the framework of Cold War History even more than the second volume, including articles on intellectual history (Jan-Werner Müller), questions of the development of science and technology during the Cold War (David Reynolds), and also some areas seemingly far from the topical area such as the biosphere, migration, consumer capitalism (articles by J.R. McNeill, Matthew Connelly, Emily Rosenberg)

Apart from these ‘non-traditional’ issues, the authors focus on common themes, tied to the development of international relations and the context of the two superpowers. The main focus here is on the final stage of the Cold War, including the late period of détente and the renewed Cold War, starting a fresh round of confrontations between the USSR and the USA. The authors discuss the various policy shifts occurring in Soviet foreign policy, especially during the period of perestroika under Mikhail S. Gorbachev, when, as a consequence of the radical transformation of the entire system of international relations, the socialist camp collapsed and the Cold War came to an end.

Several articles examine issues of détente and its demise, both in the sphere of relations between East and West and in the so-called “Third World” - Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Vladislav M. Zubok focuses on the Soviet part of this process. The author believes that the explanation for the end of détente cannot be limited to the sphere of international relations, as Soviet foreign policy was formed largely under the influence of the internal decline experienced by the Soviet regime. At the same time it remained hostage to “ideological predilections and strategic anxieties of the aging Politburo politicians” (111). Although Moscow was interested in continuing the policy of détente, which served as a substitute for domestic economic, financial and political reforms (96), it could not overcome ideological prejudices and reconcile the interest in cooperation with the West with opportunistic aspirations on the African continent and in the Near and Middle East.

Olav Njolstad agrees with Zubok, providing a wide panorama of the process of the end of détente, since, in his opinion, détente did not end overnight. Rather, Njolstad writes, “it was a slow, eroding process” in which many events and factors reinforced one another mutually, wearing away the mutual consensus between East and West on key issues (135). Njolstad identifies five “fundamental factors” that contributed to the collapse of détente, including a lack of mutual trust between leaders of opposing blocs, the lack of shared values and outlook, and the weakness of economic interdependence of the USSR and the West (152-153). He also draws attention to the desire of both parties to achieve geopolitical advantages in competition with each other and, finally, to their reluctance to

abandon the arms race, which ended up with political leaders from both sides pushing the interests of their respective military-industrial complexes.

Articles by Amin Saikal on the rise of Islam, the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, John H. Coatsworth about processes in Latin America and Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow about the events of this period in southern Africa add to many of the concerns expressed by Zubok and Njolstad about superpower rivalry in different regions of the world.

Considerable attention is paid to the end of the Cold War and its consequences for the development of international relations today. All authors devoting articles to this topic agree that the main factor leading to the cessation of the confrontation between East and West and the end of the Cold War was the policy of “new thinking”, proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev in the process of restructuring that began with his arrival at the head of the Soviet leadership. According to a prominent researcher of this period, Archie Brown, the Cold War ended because the new Soviet leader’s radically different worldview was able to initiate a “conceptual revolution as well as systemic change” in the field of domestic and foreign policy (266). Specifying his point, Brown argues that since the beginning of Gorbachev’s rule, he sought to bring an end to the Cold War, considering the confrontation as an obstacle to the implementation of plans for economic reform and improving the welfare of Soviet citizens (248). In this case, Brown casts doubt on what he calls a “common simplification”, attributing the motivation behind Moscow’s policy change to pressure from the Reagan administration, in particular in the arms race (264).

In an article devoted to the analysis of U.S. foreign policy during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, Beth Fisher agrees with Brown’s viewpoint. According to Fisher, the role of the two U.S. Presidents in ending the Cold War confrontation was secondary, although critical. The author believes that the “changes in Soviet foreign policy were of much greater magnitude - and more painful - than were the changes in U.S. policy,” and, “while Presidents Reagan and Bush sought to improve superpower relations, they certainly did not meet Gorbachev halfway.” (288) Jacques Leveque, in an article on the decline of the socialist camp in Eastern Europe, concurs. Leveque considers the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc to be a direct result of changes taking place in the Soviet Union at this time. In addition, it is significant to note that Soviet approval for the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe is seen as the main precondition for the victory of the “velvet revolutions” (311).

Most researchers attribute the end of the Cold War to 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, the “grim symbol of the “Iron Curtain “(see Helga Haftendorn’s article), and the socialist camp in Europe ceased to exist. In addition, according to Archie Brown, by 1989, the changes in the Soviet political system went beyond the confines of the communist nature of the Soviet regime, which was the indicator of the Cold War as a clash of opposite systems (262). However, some scholars hold the view that the Cold War ended with the termination of the existence of one of the top contenders in the confrontation, i.e., with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a volume dedicated to the end of the Cold War, articles about the collapse of the Soviet Union highlight the need to take this viewpoint into account. Nevertheless,

Alex Pravda in “The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990-1991” has no doubt that the “collapse of the Soviet Union was mainly the result of internal factors” (356). However, these factors, in his opinion, were most closely related to the changed situation in the international arena, particularly in Eastern Europe, where an example of transformation, on the one hand, stimulated the centrifugal processes in the USSR, and on the other hand, served as an example of peaceful means to solve the problem of independence. The influence of the Eastern European example, Pravda believes, contributed to the collapse of the USSR in such an amazingly quick and peaceful manner (377).

An article by G. John Ikenberry, analyzing changes in the system of international relations after the Cold War, completes the third volume of the *CHCW*. The main argument of the author is the assertion that the end of the Cold War has not led to the birth of a new order on the world stage, but marked the victory of the Western liberal system headed by the U.S., having already formed in the foundation of the bipolar world (535) as the only viable system. This system, however, entered a period of crisis with the new millennium, caused by the lack of a United States’ commitment to continue to play a leadership role in terms of new threats and challenges that have arisen in the twenty-first century. (537).

In the third volume, the authors succeeded in somewhat correcting the Western bias in the analysis of the end of the Cold War. However, in many respects, this is probably due to the exceptional role played by Gorbachev’s Soviet Union in the final stage. Generally, this means we can consider the *CHCW* as nothing more than an attempt to create an international Cold War history.

Among other things, attention is drawn to a certain looseness of structure of the publication, which finds expression, in particular, in overlapping and frequently matching subjects analyzed in articles by different authors. While perhaps a coincidence, and probably inevitable, given the multifaceted phenomenon of the Cold War and the interconnectedness of many of its aspects, it results in many repetitions. The same topics are discussed by several authors. The lack of forethought and structure of the publication is demonstrated by the appearance of articles in both the second and third volumes beyond the thematic range, for example, the placement in the third volume of articles on the role of Japan since 1960 (Michael Schaller), although chronologically and contextually it does not fit into the logical structure of this volume.

Nevertheless, despite all these shortcomings, the *CHCW* represents a significant step forward in the study of global confrontation. It is also necessary to applaud the good number of illustrations in all three volumes, the presence of 40 exciting, high-quality photographs, as well as maps and diagrams. The scrupulously compiled index of all three volumes placed at the end of the first volume is very helpful.

Becoming familiar with the specialized knowledge represented in the *CHCW* will undoubtedly have an impact on the direction of further research efforts in this area of international relations history of the twentieth century. Accumulating the collected scholarship on the events of the Cold War, this publication serves as an important source of

information for a wide readership and an excellent educational tool for students and young people desiring a new way to read the pages of a recent past.

Review by Scott Lucas, University of Birmingham

It is rare for a volume which aspires to be as rich and varied in its perspectives as the 602 pages of Volume III of *The Cambridge History of The Cold War* to be defined by its first sentence. Yet here is such a definition, in an essay by Jan-Werner Müller --- “In retrospect, the mid-1970s seem like the high point of what one might call the crisis of the West, or at least the high point of an acute consciousness of crisis in the West.” (1)

Reading this sentence in 2011 is jarring. The “West” has been embroiled in a protracted financial crisis. The “War on Terror”, with all its political, military, economic, and social dislocations, nears its second decade. “Liberal democracy”, which was supposedly triumphant in 1991, is far from a universally-accepted concept. Environmental issues and resource shortages raise fundamental questions about the claimed progressive advance of Western economic systems. Yet Müller seems to be assuring us that “our” crisis --- and this is very much a book written by academics of the “West” for readers in the “West” --- can be boxed up and shelved in the past.

I guess the answer might be that Müller’s assertion is meant only to refer to the period between 1945 and 1991 and, in particular, the latter part of the conflict in a volume dedicated to “Endings”. Yet such an answer exposes the self-imposed limitation of this collection: with few exceptions, its essays hermetically seal their examinations away from any wider consideration of issues that may have preceded, operated outside, and continued beyond the framework of the “Cold War”.

Thus, for example, Amin Saikal’s contribution on “Islamism, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan” has nothing on the influence of centuries of Islamism --- in Iran or Afghanistan --- before the entry of the Soviet Union and the U.S. into their countries. (Nor does Saikal acknowledge Iranian relations with Britain, which may have played at least a small part in events such as the 1953 overthrow of the Mossadegh Government.) John Coatsworth’s treatment of “The Cold War in Central America, 1975-1991” – actually an essay on Nicaragua, El Salvador, and briefly Guatemala --- refers to Latin American governments, political movements, and interest groups but never considers them; they are props for a narrative on U.S. policy. “The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976-1990”, by Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow, is better at bringing in local institutions as meaningful actors, but it still imposes the Cold War and “its lasting legacies” on the region; there is little on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, or other countries outside the framework of U.S.-Cuban-Soviet competition.

Because of this somewhat artificial framework for the collection and many of its essays, the more effective pieces are narrower studies of individual systems that move beyond a recitation of events. Vladislav Zubok’s study of Soviet foreign policy from 1975 to 1985 and Chen Jian’s “China and the Cold War After Mao” are useful surveys. Archie Brown’s analysis of “The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War” is even better, building on lucid description to an incisive critique: “The changes that made up ‘the Gorbachev revolution’ had many sources, but what made them possible to implement was an

interdependent mixture of ideas, leadership, and institutional power.” (265) Alex Pravda’s consideration of the collapse of the Soviet Union has useful flourishes, negotiating between the internal Soviet dynamics and the “Western” approach to consider “how the international dimension of the perestroika project figured in its domestic development”. (376)

But these are individual visions leaving aside an approach which sets the “Cold War” as a term in negotiation with developments, inside and between countries, systems, and communities, rather than installing it as a catch-all framework. Indeed, there are areas of the world which disappear. There is no significant acknowledgement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian question, or the Iran-Iraq War, let alone an essay on the Middle East and North Africa.

The volume’s latter essays, tacking on the Cold War to a series of themes --- science and technology, transnational organisations, the biosphere, human rights, and consumer capitalism --- cannot cover for this elision of many people who may not have seen the U.S.-Soviet conflict as central to their lives. Instead, they lead to the lifting of the curtain in the one post-Cold War essay: G. John Ikenberry’s “The Restructuring of the International System after the Cold War”.

Ikenberry’s concern is not really the “international”, at least in the sense of treating movements outside the U.S. as autonomous or, indeed, as anything more than followers of either the “Cold War bipolar order” or “the American-led liberal hegemonic order”. (535) Those largely unnamed and one-dimensional actors come out only in post-1991 globalisation as “new players” producing “fragmentation and disorder in the Middle East and Africa, and the rise of fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere”. (536) They are “security threats” and “new discontents” before “American unipolarity”. (537) For Ikenberry, they are merely the walk-ons for his admiration of a Cold War stage which starred U.S. pre-eminence and his concern over the loss of that proscenium:

The “liberal project” was brought into the postwar world with the help of a hidden hand of American hegemony and Cold War bipolarity. The end of the Cold War, unipolarity, eroded sovereignty, and transformed security threats provide a less favorable environment in which to safeguard and manage liberal order. (556)

Ikenberry’s essay is not only a conclusion to the volume; it is the herald of its *raison d’être*. The collection --- like other prominent books on the Cold War --- is an attempt to establish order on our comprehension of the era between 1945 and 1991. That does not necessarily mean a eulogy to the U.S.-led liberal order that Ikenberry champions, but it does mean a staging in which countries take their rightful place in the confrontations and negotiations. Here is Washington. Here is the Soviet Union. Here are the Chinese. Here are the key locations of Western Europe and Eastern Europe, where the Cold War was defined and “won”. And here, possibly, are other areas --- Central America, Southern Africa --- to give a supporting presence.

But key areas of the world were “disorderly”, not only because they were in conflict but because they were beyond the artificial Cold War framework. So the Middle East is far too messy to come into this volume, and Iran and Afghanistan only take a place because they can be wedged against each other --- in an incomplete, misleading juxtaposition --- in a U.S.-Soviet scenario. South America and its turmoils of the 1970s and 1980s --- turmoils which included the tensions and deadly costs of military dictatorships and a war between two U.S. allies but which did not feature bipolar clashes --- never gets a line.

I am not suggesting that the Cambridge History should be converted into a comprehensive encyclopedia, giving each country and group 15 seconds of reading time. Instead, it is the approach to a U.S.-centred order that requires scrutiny.

And in a redemptive essay in the volume, Matthew Connelly does just that. His work on “Global Migration, Public Health, and Population Control” is challenging in its specific topic: “How...might the Cold War be seen as a struggle to control populations, and not just territory, with the two superpowers adopting contrasting but comparable approaches to policing their biopolitical boundaries?” (467) However, the first part of his title, “The Cold War in the *Longue Durée*”, offers an even bigger challenge: “We can begin to assess the Cold War’s impact on history over the *longue durée* only by situating it in a more global perspective, one takes account of changes in populations and the environment.” (487)

Connelly may be reconfiguring another set of satellite issues to revolve around the Cold War, rather than considering that the Cold War was an artificial construction that may not have been central to these populations and their environments. But as he states, his aspiration is to “suggest an agenda rather than proffer definitive conclusions”. (467)

And in that agenda, which opens interrogation rather than closes it down with the imposition of the Cold War “order”, lies the promise of further study.

Citizens and historians have long questioned – after more than forty years of Cold War rivalry – what was responsible for its end. Among the causes most often put forward has been that of the technical and economic challenges posed by the Reagan administration’s extensive arms build-up. It was, and is, argued that the Soviet Union’s economic malaise, caused by its efforts to match the U. S. military spending, prompted Kremlin leaders to surrender.

An undercurrent of thinking during the Ronald Reagan presidency, especially during the first term, held that expanding America’s defense spending and exploiting its technological advantages, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative, would cause the competitive Soviet economy to falter and bring the Cold War to an end. This view gained brief support in the immediate afterglow of the Soviet Union’s collapse when Tom Wicker, a relentless critic of the administration, conceded that Reagan’s SDI program and the extensive military buildup had probably forced the Soviets to re-examine their international and domestic policies.¹

For the English observer Paul Johnson, the vulnerability of the Soviet Union demonstrated the magnitude of the Reagan triumph. The Reagan rearmament program had demoralized the Soviet elite and compelled it to embark on the “risky and potentially disastrous road to reform.” For Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberg, what produced the U.S.S.R.’s collapse was the capacity and willingness of the administration to outspend the Soviets and thereby exhaust their resources and capabilities. Peter Schweizer, another Reagan bureaucrat, averred that the Pentagon’s build-up persuaded the Kremlin that it lacked the financial resources to sustain its global Cold War with the United States. Reagan policies, Schweizer concluded, were absolutely critical to the demise of their system. Unfortunately for former Cold War hawks and neoconservatives alike, this view is not sustained by the available data.²

Others have speculated that Gorbachev’s fear of SDI’s potential was the driving force behind his willingness to accept deep and unprecedented cuts in his nation’s nuclear arsenal. However, by the early 1970s, Soviet scientists had recognized the enormous technical difficulties of creating a shield against missiles, each carrying independently targeted multiple warheads, in the near term. At that time, they demonstrated that adding inexpensive decoys to each of its missiles could overcome even sophisticated antimissile defenses, thus prompting the Kremlin’s endorsement of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko angrily denounced Reagan’s SDI program because he believed that an extensive American ABM system could enhance its ability to

¹ Tom Wicker, “Plenty of Credit,” *New York Times*, December 5, 1989.

² Paul Johnson, “Europe and the Reagan Years,” *Foreign Affairs* 68(1) (1989): pp. 34-37; Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner, 1990); Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994).

launch a first strike, a threat the administration rhetoric appeared to confirm. He urged threatening a “tit-for-tat” weapons response. Additionally, the Kremlin feared the SDI program would initiate the placing of nuclear weapons in space and create yet another arms race.

Senior Soviet scientists Yevgeny Velikhov and Andrei Kokoshin, around the same time, provided a very different point of view. Calling the SDI program an improbable venture, they contributed significantly to strategic debates in the mid-1980s by choosing to ignore the demand for weapons parity and emphasizing the idea of an “asymmetric response.” This policy involved a realistic appraisal of SDI’s limits and the relative ease of introducing inexpensive countermeasures to defeat it.³ Gorbachev finally agreed and ceased his concern.

The Soviet Union’s economic malaise, while undoubtedly deepened by 25 percent of GNP continually being set aside for the military-industrial complex, has been more properly attributed to the rigid “command economy” system established in the 1930s. Production and investment decisions were in the hands of a centralized bureaucracy that could ignore market factors, competition, and individual or collective initiatives. Contemporary Western observers, moreover, underestimated the Soviet military-industrial complex’s dominant role in controlling Soviet expenditures and its ability to resist the Soviet leader’s efforts at reform. “Soviet defense spending under Brezhnev and Gorbachev was primarily a response to internal imperatives [and was] not correlated with American defense spending,” according to Richard Lebow and Janice Stein. “Nor is there any observable relationship between the defense spending and changes in the political relationship between the superpowers.”⁴ This was mainly because the Kremlin had no reason to fear the United States. The Reagan build-up never conveyed a threat of war; rather, it dangled in a policy vacuum. If anything, the expanded defense program enabled the Soviet military establishment to sustain its pressures on the Kremlin.

The persistent claim of Cold War hawks and neoconservatives that American foreign policy – grounded in the pursuit of military superiority – achieved victory in the Cold War is, in the words of Robert English’s considered judgment, “greatly oversimplified.” He suggests the Reagan military build-up, coupled with the administration’s aggressive rhetoric, actually “made the accession of genuine reformist leadership more difficult. The effort to tilt the military balance sharply in the West’s favour certainly heightened Soviet perceptions of deepening problems and a need for a change.” The contention, however, that that the military build-up and SDI caused the system to collapse, English concludes,

³ Aleksandra’ G. Savel’yev and Nickolay N. Detinov, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), pp. 21-22. For doubts among the American scientific community, see Richard Dean Burns, *The Missile Defense Systems of George W. Bush: A Critical Assessment* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), p. 35.

⁴ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 372.

reflects “a lapse in basic counterfactual reasoning, if not an even more deterministic triumphalism.”⁵

Leaving Washington, hours after George H. W. Bush was sworn in, Reagan declared flatly, “The Cold War is over.” Weeks ahead of most policymakers, the American public too grasped that the Cold War was over after hearing Gorbachev’s December 1988 speech at the United Nations. Public opinion polls revealed that 54 percent of Americans now considered the Soviet to be either “no threat” or “only a minor threat,” while 60 odd percent believed the Soviets now were essentially focused on their own security, and only 28 percent thought they were still seeking world domination. Frances Fitzgerald summed it up best: “Gorbachev launched a political revolution in the Soviet Union. Few in Washington understood what he was doing or where he was going, and the Cold War was over before the American policy establishment knew it.”⁶

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan’s former expert on Soviet affairs, has argued that individuals who give the American president full credit for ending the Cold War do so “out of a sense of partisanship.”⁷ And those who extend total credit to Gorbachev doubtless fall into the same trap, though there is a growing consensus that the subsequent unravelling of Moscow-dominated communism was an unintended side effect of Gorbachev’s reforms. Termination of the Cold War was not. Reaching agreed upon conclusions apropos how the Cold War ended is still in the hands of the historical jury and will be for many years; yet it is possible to reach an interim judgment. This is why the publication of Volume III (*Endings*) of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* is at once timely and useful. It is also a major undertaking.

A large, multinational project, with seventy-three contributors from eighteen different countries, the *Cambridge History of the Cold War (CHCW)*, edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, is essentially an international history of the Cold War, ten years in the making. Volume I (*Origins*) examines the origins, causes and early years of the Cold War while Volume II (*Crises and Détente*) examines the developments that made the Cold War into a long-lasting international system during the 1960s and 1970s. Within the space of 25 chapters and 694 pages – with the rest of the book turned over to a serviceable bibliographical essay and an adequate index – Volume III (*Endings*) of the *CHCW* examines the evolution of the conflict from the Helsinki Conference of 1975 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The contributing scholars, mainly from the United States and the UK, with some representation from Canada, Europe, South Africa, and Australia, analyse “the

⁵ Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 33-34.

⁶ Frances Fitzgerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan and Star Wars and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 17-18, pp. 466-71.

⁷ James R. Matlock, Jr., *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 323. Also see James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking Press, 2009).

economic, social, cultural, religious, technological, and geopolitical factors that ended the Cold War,” often discussing “the personalities, and policies of key leaders such as Brezhnev, Reagan, Gorbachev, Thatcher, Kohl, and Deng Xiaoping.” Presumably moving “far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs” (xv) (one wonders when exactly this became unfashionable?)⁸—the editors claim *Endings* “represents the new international history at its best, emphasizing broad, social, economic, demographic and strategic developments while keeping politics and human agency in focus” (i). Intellectually, the editors further claim, “the *CHCW* aspires to contribute to a transformation of the field from national – primarily American – views to a broader international approach” (xvi). This of course will be news to Cold War scholars who research and publish on the subject, from their own international perspective, in the universities of Europe and the British Commonwealth. And it probably would also be news to the many scholars who populate global and international studies and have pioneered interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches to exploring the legacies of Cold War rivalry in comparative and transnational perspectives.⁹ Nonetheless, they will find *Endings* a useful addition to a growing and important literature.

Generally speaking, the essays are of a very high quality, which is exactly what one would expect of a book with the hallmarks of published proceedings of this nature. That said, I should like to comment on three that struck me as particularly worthy of mention, namely, the essays by Archie Brown (“The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War”), David Reynolds (“Science, technology and the Cold War”), and Sir Adam Roberts (“An ‘incredibly swift transition’: reflections on the end of the Cold War”). They alone are worth the price of admission. The fact that they are traditional historians from Oxford and Cambridge should come as no real surprise; they write pretty good history in that neck of the woods.

As a world authority on the life and times of Mikhail Gorbachev, Archie Brown is perfectly positioned to sketch out the contours and significance of “the Gorbachev revolution,” as well as the early developments of the general secretary’s “new thinking,” with “1988 the year in which he moved from being a reformer of the Soviet system to a systematic transformer” (245). Brown wisely points out that party members had no notion how radical a shift in Soviet policy they were inaugurating when they elected Gorbachev as their leader in March 1985. Equally important, he continues, nor did Gorbachev: “He knew he was much more of a reformer and a ‘new thinker’ on foreign policy than were the Politburo members who had chosen him, but events were to move in unexpected directions and some of his actions and inactions (such as eschewing the use of force in Eastern Europe) had major unintended as well as intended consequences” (247-48). Brown then turns his

⁸ See Joseph M. Siracusa, *Diplomacy: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. xiii-xvi.

⁹ See bibliographical essays in Paul Battersby and Joseph M. Siracusa, *Globalization and Human Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 229-39; and Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa, and Sasho Ripiloski, *Crime Wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, forthcoming).

attention to institutional factors in policy innovation and Soviet foreign policy in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, all of which played a conditioning role in ending the Cold War. Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis Brown places on “informal transnational influences,” by which he means, among other things, the trips abroad of specialists in research institutions, the unusually wide experience of the Western world on Gorbachev’s appointments, and, especially, the significance of Gorbachev’s travels abroad, which shook “his ‘a priori faith in the advantages of socialist over bourgeois democracy’” (260-61). But, as Brown makes clear, ideas on their own were never enough to end the Cold War. What did, then? “The Cold War ended when it did because of the confluence of events that brought a leader with a mindset different from that of every other member of Brezhnev’s, Adropov’s, and Chernenko’s Politburo to the locus of greatest institutional power within the system” (266). From there, Gorbachev was able to change the world. This is a brilliant conclusion in chapter of less than 22 pages.

No less brilliant is David Reynolds’s rendering of science and technology during the Cold War. A traditional diplomatic historian by training, Reynolds is no stranger to global history. His *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945*¹⁰ is the best text available in the crowded and growing world of international history. In a chapter that ranges the duration of the Cold War, Reynolds focuses on the development of transistors, satellites, and computers, pointing out that while both sides of the Cold War rivalry spawned massive military-industrial complexes, “the American version was much better integrated with the larger economy and society,” the Soviet system less so. The upshot, according to Reynolds: “In the short term, this enabled the Soviet Union to punch above its economic weight as a military power. By the 1980s, however, technology and information had become the Soviet Achilles’ heel” (378). Within the space of 21 pages, Reynolds narrates the story of transistors and the revolution in electronics; satellites and the revolution in communications; computers and the revolution in information; and the “information society” and the end of the Cold War. Each development, stimulated and financed in their crucial stages by military imperatives, upped the ante for the Soviets, as satellites and computers played a greater and greater role in Cold War intelligence and directing complex weapons systems. Especially significant was the personal computer, refined outside the military sphere, which “brought to crisis point the information deficit in Soviet society” (399). Combined, concludes Reynolds, all of these proved a significant factor in the Soviet collapse.

The last chapter under consideration is “An ‘incredibly swift transition’ reflections on the end of the Cold War,” by Sir Adam Roberts, emeritus professor of international relations at Oxford University and a fellow of Balliol College. After reflecting on “What was the Cold War?” and “Who foresaw change?” Sir Adam examines six possible explanations of its end: the Soviet leadership reached a rational decision to liquidate a system that did not work; the U. S. leadership turned the tide of the Cold War against Moscow; a stable international framework made it possible for political risks to be taken; the Helsinki process provided a basis for a new politics of human rights within the bloc; non-violent opposition in Eastern

¹⁰ David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London: Penguin Books, 2001).

Europe and the USSR assisted change; and nationalism contributed to the end of the USSR and the Cold War. The answer? “The historical evidence,” argues Roberts, suggests a multi-faceted explanation of the end of the Cold War,” as “Each of the six possible explanations . . . is well-supported and has persuasive power” (533) Roberts also believes that the immediate post-Cold War world was one for the better, especially the avoidance of major war and the consolidation of democratic systems in many Eastern European countries. Yet, this was not to say, he concludes, that the post-Cold War world was without problems. Failed and failing states in parts of Africa and Asia, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the international war on terror gave the successors of the Cold War rivalry plenty to think about.

Response by Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia, and Odd Arne Westad, London School of Economics

We wish to begin by thanking the editors of H-Diplo for bestowing so much attention on the three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War (CHCW)*. We are very pleased that each was reviewed separately, and we want to thank our commentators for doing such a thorough job. We are delighted by the very positive reception they have garnered, and we appreciate some of the constructive criticism. We know all too well the considerable hurdles and challenges that inhere in such a huge undertaking.

Our greatest creative challenge was at the onset: designing the architecture of the three volumes. Our goal was to highlight the richness of our field's collective enterprise and to portray the Cold War in the many dimensions that had been evolving in our scholarly articles and monographs. We sought to illuminate the diverse interpretive approaches and to convey the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the Cold War in all their complexity. Knowing how the field had been developing, we wanted to highlight not just the geopolitical, ideological, strategic, and economic dimensions of the Cold War, but also the social, cultural, and intellectual trends that shaped the Cold War and were shaped by it. Most of all, our aim was to present the Cold War as an international history, not just a Soviet-American product. Yet we wanted to do this without doing an injustice to the essential features of the Cold War.

The *Cambridge History of the Cold War* is an effort to put the Cold War in the larger context of twentieth century history, without losing sight of the centrality of our general topic -- the Cold War. To do this, as many of our reviewers noted, we started and ended each volume with numerous chapters that set the Cold War in a larger economic, ideological, cultural, and geopolitical context. We knew we needed to cover certain basic topics like decision-making in Washington and Moscow, the Sino-Soviet split, European integration, the wars in Indochina, and the Cuban missile crisis, but our desire was to set all these familiar topics in a larger context, both to understand their causes and to reflect on their consequences. That is why, in particular, we made such a special effort in volume three to conclude with a half-dozen essays dealing with the complicated interconnections between the Cold War and the environment, human rights, transnational organizations, consumer capitalism, science and technology, global society, and the configuration of the international system.

Because we designed the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* to reflect the richness and diversity of the field, we knew we would sacrifice the coherence of a single narrative and interpretive thread. Some critics have noted this matter, and we acknowledge that that is an accurate description of what has occurred, but we wish to stress that this was precisely our intention. Both of us have presented our own interpretive approaches in our books and articles; we did not see the *CHCW* as a secret weapon to pitch our own viewpoints. We welcomed diversity, and wanted to highlight it. We selected contributors purposefully to reflect different orientations, methodologies, and perspectives. We consciously sought to represent the different schools of interpretation, but we insisted that each essay seek a

non-polemical tone that took cognizance explicitly or implicitly of alternative explanations. Because every chapter was vetted at a workshop and because our contributors so nobly embraced our aspiration, we feel that the overall tone and coverage fulfilled our goal. We are pleased that most of the commentators agree.

Of course, some critics noted that the geographical representation of contributors was skewed in favor of British and American historians, even though they acknowledge that key chapters are written by German, Russian, Chinese, Afghan, French, Italian, Japanese, South African, Hungarian, and other scholars. Our intent was not to represent nationalities; our intent was not to highlight a British “school,” or an American “school,” or a Russian “school,” partly because we did not think such “schools” existed. What we did try to do was to identify the best scholars who had done research in the archives of the appropriate nations. In many cases, of course, we had to choose among several excellent candidates; as a consequence, we were not able to include all the people we would have preferred. But our intent throughout was to choose distinguished scholars, young and old, from a multitude of disciplines. We did consciously seek to include political scientists, sociologists, and economists as well as historians.

We spent a lot of time thinking about the specific contents of each volume. Since we were constrained by page limits, we had tough choices to make regarding the specific topics to be covered. We knew that we would exclude some things that others might regard as valuable. We also knew that we could not possibly cover each topic in each chronological volume. In a sense we were akin to Cold War policymakers faced with making tough choices and deciding priorities. Some critics would have liked to have seen chapters on neutral and non-aligned nations in the Cold War, like Austria, Finland, or India; others wanted to see more chapters on covert operations and intelligence analyses in each volume; still others desired to learn more about the military balance and conventional armaments. What is reassuring is that there is little consensus in the reviews about what should have been added, and almost no one commented on chapters that might have been deleted in order to make room for additions -- and that was the tough choice we faced. In retrospect, we think we probably should have included a chapter in the middle volume on the conventional arms race, arms limitation initiatives, and the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Instead we focused on highlighting the strategic dimensions of the arms race in a chapter in Volume One and another in Volume Two. Likewise, we now think that in addition to the chapter on the Cold War and Central America, 1975-1991, in Volume Three, we should have incorporated a chapter on the Cold War and South America in the 1960s and 1970s in Volume Two.

We were aware that some chapters stretched across the chronological parameters of each volume. Some commentators found that confusing, but in our view it represented the realities of Cold War dynamics (and the space limitations under which we were working). Yes, it would have been nice to have separate chapters on France in each volume, for example, or on China and Japan. But the influence of Charles de Gaulle stretched beyond the confines of the early Cold War, and shaped the trajectory of French policy and European integration through the years covered in all three volumes. Likewise, the aim of our contributors was not to outline the history of Muslim influence in Iran or Afghanistan

or the evolution of Japanese or Chinese politics in a specific time frame, but to highlight national developments and regional dynamics that illuminated key trajectories of the Cold War, trajectories that sometimes stretched beyond the artificial chronological framework of each of the volumes.

Nor was it our aim to portray the overall history of the twentieth century. One critic in particular noted that we did not highlight all the issues and events that occurred during the Cold War, like the Arab-Israeli struggle, the Palestine question, and the Iran-Iraq war. Of course, that is true. Although one of the chapters in Volume Three specifically addressed the possibility that the Cold War might turn out to be less important than other demographic and environmental issues that were happening concurrently, we, the editors, regarded this project as a history of the Cold War, not of the twentieth century. We wanted, as noted above, to place the Cold War in a larger context that embraced economic and ideological trends that went back to the mid-nineteenth century and we wanted to embed the Cold War in the bloody history of the twentieth century, including two world wars, a great depression, and the Holocaust, but we never pretended to think that the history of the Cold War was the history of the twentieth century. Hence the volumes do not deal with many matters that operated outside the Cold War, but to say, as one reviewer claims, that the chapters in the *Cambridge History* “hermetically seal their examination from any wider consideration of issues” strikes us as way off the mark. Nor do we think that these volumes will be of interest only to readers “in the ‘West’,” as this critic claims. After all, what constitutes the “West” has changed markedly over the last few years; even to use such a term to represent our contemporary situation seems somewhat antiquated to us. With many chapters dealing with decolonization, with the Sino-Soviet split, with wars on the periphery, and with revolutionary nationalism and modernization, we think we have appropriately situated the Cold War in a larger global context. Might readers in China and Japan, in Angola and South Africa, in Iran and Afghanistan, in Cuba and Guatemala profit from reading the *CHCW*? We think so!

Among the things that will help them are the maps, photos, bibliographies, and index. We are very pleased that a number of reviewers commented favorably on the evocative photos, the useful index (which appears in all three volumes), and the helpful bibliographies. We spent a lot of hours selecting pictures, revising the index, reworking the maps, and completing some of the bibliographies (which in most instances were done by the contributors).

Now that we have mentioned the contributors, this is a fitting time to thank them again publicly for their excellent work and timely submissions. We were fortunate to work with a great group of collaborators. Our workshop conferences were informative and stimulating; we had a fantastic opportunity to renew old acquaintances and to make new friends. It is no secret that we pressed our authors relentlessly both to rewrite and revise as well as to meet rigid deadlines. What is amazing is the cooperation that we garnered. A project that began in 2002-3 and that we imagined would take about eight to ten years was finished almost precisely on time. We have them to thank.

One of our commentators noted that it was an irony that although the Cambridge histories were designed to acquaint students and scholars with the state of the field, the volumes were priced exorbitantly and out of their reach. We agree with this observation, and we are very pleased to convey the news that the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* is now appearing in a paperback version that will not be cheap, but will be much more affordable. We hope you and your students will find these volumes as useful as many as our reviewers think they are.

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